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Abstract 
The paper presents the application of the 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technique 
for surveillance test interval (STI) evaluation. 
Assessment was performed for the reactor 
protection system (RPS) based upon the living 
PRA model of the Taipower's Maanshan 
power plant. Fault tree was developed and 
analyzed to find the most proper subsystem for 
test interval relaxation. Event tree analyses 
were made to calculate core melt down 
frequencies for test induced transients and 
anticipated transient without scram events and 
to evaluate the effect of STI relaxation. 
Results indicated that an extension of three 
times of the current RPS test interval has no 
significant risk impact for the Maanshan plant. 
Introduction 
Risk-based evaluations for supporting plant 
operation, maintenance, and regulation have 
gained increasingly interests in Taiwan's 
nuclear industry. During the past three years, 
research groups in Taiwan have developed the 
living risk models as well as shutdown risk 
models for all three nuclear stations under the 
support of the Nuclear Safety Department 
(NSD) of Taipower Company (TPC). The 
TPC also encourages activities to apply these 
living risk models to assist plant daily 
operation. One of such activities is to evaluate 
the adequacy of the surveillance test interval 
(STI); this paper is aimed at the reactor 
protection system (RPS) of the TPC's 
Maanshan nuclear power station (h4NPS) in 
this aspect.[l] This project is a first time 
attempt to analyze the STI issue from risk 
viewpoint in Taiwan; it is not to challenge the 
Taiwan's regulatory position on the STI issue 
but to serve as a base of discussion in the area 
of risk-based regulations in Taiwan's nuclear 
community. 
RPS Fault Tree 
The M N P S  is a Westinghouse designed 
three-loop PWR plant. The RPS is composed 
of solid state logic circuits which provide 15 
trip fbnctions in the power operational mode. 
Figure 1 is the overall RPS structure for fault 
tree design. Individual sensorshransducers, 
bistable comparison modules, universaVlow 
voltage circuit boards, and trip breakers were 
considered as the basic components in the 
fault tree. The flow diagram of the fault tree 
is illustrated in Fig.2; it is aimed to calculate 
the failure probability of each trip fhction. In 
the fault tree, the failure of each basic 
components was defined as a basic events 
except the failure toward a safe direction (i.e. 
lead to a trip). Common mode failures and 
human errors, such as operators failed to 
scram and putting bypass trip breaker in the 
wrong position, were modeled. The adequacy 
of the tree structure was then checked using 
minimum cutset analyses. 
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Fig. 1 Block diagram for RPS fault tree design 
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As shown in Fig.2, the events of control 
rod failure and manual scram failure are 
located near the top of the fault tree and 
dominate the RPS failure probability. In order 
to clearly reveal the effect of test interval 
relaxation, we first ignore the events of 
manual scram failure and control rod failure. 
These two events are considered later in 
sensitivity studies. In the fault tree analysis, 
cut sets with a contribution less than 10''' on 
the RPS failure probability were truncated. 
Under these conditions, we performed RPS 
fault tree analyses to evaluate the effect of test 
interval relaxation, the staggered versus 
sequential test approach, and the sensitivity of 
common mode failures on the RPS failure 
probability as follows. 
Fig.2 Flow diagram of RPS fault tree 
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Table I is the current test intervals given by 
the M N P S  technical specification; we also 
extended the intervals to three and six times 
except for the sensor and control rods. We 
then calculated the failure probability and its 
uncertainty of each trip fhction. Results 
indicate that the 95% uncertainty band covers 
the variation due to test interval relaxation. It 
suggests that the test interval relaxation has no 
significant risk impact compared to data 
uncertainties. If we extend the test interval for 
each subsystem, results indicate that the solid 
state protection system (SSPS) has the largest 
risk and the bistable comparator modules have 
the smallest risk impact on the RPS failure 
probability. 
Basic Component 
Breaker 
SSPS 
Bistables 
Table.1 Surveillance test interval 
Surveillance Test Interval 
(month) 
Current Extended Extended 
Value 3 Times 6Times 
2 6 12 
2 6 12 
1 3 6 
3 rJuclear Instrument System 6 
Control Rod I 1 
In the above fault tree analysis, the 
component failure rate data were taken from 
generic data sets. [2-61 Calculations were also 
made using the plant specific data to reflect 
the M N P S  operation and maintenance 
conditions. Generic data and plant specific 
data were combined using the Bayesian theory. 
The results obtained from the two data sets 
are compared and found no significant 
differences. Thus, we decided to use the 
generic data sets for the following calculations. 
We also compared two test approaches, 
sequential test and staggered test. The 
1 1 
staggered test gave a slightly lower RPS 
failure probability. Although the difference 
obtained from reliability analyses is small; in 
practice, the staggered test should have less 
noise interference. 
Data for human error and common cause 
failure are rare and have large uncertainties. 
We took sensitivity studies to find their impact. 
Calculations indicated that putting the bypass 
trip breakers in the wrong position has no 
much impact, if the probability can be kept 
smaller than lo”. Common cause failures 
were evaluated by varying their failure data 
and applied to the RPS subsystems one at a 
time; i.e. breaker, solid state protection system 
(S SPS), nuclear instrumentation system (NIS), 
and the 7300 logic cabinet. Results indicated 
that the common cause failures associated 
with the 7300 logic cabinet as well as the NIS 
cabinet have a larger effect. The SPSS 
common mode failure is less significant. 
Event Tree Analysis 
The second part of the study is to evaluate 
the effect of test interval relaxation on core 
meltdown frequency (CDF). The CDF 
calculations were based upon the M N P S  living 
risk model developed by the Institute of 
Nuclear Energy Research (INER).[7] The 
length of test interval affects the CDF in both 
ways. Assuming a constant human error rate, 
the human error will be reduced proportionally 
to the test interval; thus, it leads to a lower 
CDF. According to the M N P S  test records 
during the past ten years from 1983 to 1992, 
there were four surveillance tests causing plant 
trip; thus, the probability for test induced trip 
is 0.2 per reactor year. We took this value to 
perform event tree analyses. One of the event 
trees in the M N P S  living risk model represents 
transient events with main feedwater available. 
This event tree contains no component failures 
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and thus can truly reflect human error effects. 
The corresponding CDF is 8.33 x lo-‘ per 
reactor-year; the CDF is reduced to 2.78 and 
1.39 x 1 0-‘ per reactor-year if test intervals are 
extended to 3 and 6 times respectively. 
On the other hand, a longer test interval 
leads to a higher component and RPS failure 
probability; thus a higher CDF. The effect is 
evaluated by applying the RPS failure 
probability to the event tree related to 
anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) 
events. In the ATWS event tree analysis, all 
trip signals were lumped together and only the 
averaged RPS failure probability was used. 
The variations of CDF (ACDF) due to test 
interval relaxation of 3 and 6 times are listed in 
Table 11. If we take the credit from the 
reduced human error probability, the ACDF 
may become negative or the plant is less risky 
for longer test intervals. 
Table I1 also lists results obtained by 
varying manual scram failure and control rod 
mechanical failure data. If test intervals are 
longer, the event of control rod mechanical 
failure becomes less significant, because the 
failure probabilities of other components are 
increased and have a larger weight. Results 
also show that if the manual scram is more 
reliable, it is less risky to lengthen test interval. 
We get the credit for CDF from test 
interval relaxation because of the reduction of 
human error probability. The amount of credit 
is directly related to the human error rate used 
in the analyses. Our present analysis is based 
upon the M N P S  plant specific test records. 
For a better understanding of the effect of the 
human failure rate, we also plot the CDF 
versus the human error rate in Fig. 3. For the 
given manual scram and control rod failure 
data, the test interval can extend three times 
without causing higher CDF, if human error 
rate is below 0.15 per reactor year. Also 
shown in Fig. 3, ACDF is negative in case of 
extending the test interval six times, if the test 
induced transient is lower than 0.35 per 
reactor year. 
As discussed above, the larger the human 
error rate is, the larger the CDF credit 
obtained from test interval relaxation. It 
should not be misunderstood that a plant with 
a larger human failure rate is more favored for 
test interval relaxation. The plant with a larger 
human error rate has a higher CDF in the 
beginning and thus, a large overall risk. In 
other words, test interval relaxation can only 
be considered for plants having a reasonably 
good operational record. 
Conclusions 
We investigated the adequacy of the RPS 
surveillance test interval from risk viewpoint. 
In the present study, we developed the RPS 
fault tree for the Maanshan plant and 
performed fault tree analyses to find the most 
proper subsystem for test interval relaxation.. 
Results indicate that extending the test interval 
of bistable units has the smallest risk impact. 
Event tree analyses were performed to observe 
the effect of interval relaxation of CDF values. 
Results indicated that an extension of three 
times of the current RPS test interval is a 
reasonable move from risk viewpoints for the 
Maanshan plant. 
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